We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems in which there are two types of heterogeneous outputs : Divisible and indivisible ones. The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule.
Introduction
This paper considers the cost sharing model de ned by a nite set of di erent goods N = f1; 2; :::; ng and a real valued function C : N + ! ; with C( ) = 0; where = (0; :::; 0). The problem consists in dividing the worth C(q) between the n goods for any point q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) in the domain. The economic interpretation is as follows: C is a (real valued) cost function of several heterogeneous outputs; given the level q of demand in each output,
we ask how total cost should be shared among the outputs. This is the cost sharing interpretation; alternatively a surplus sharing interpretation is also possible: C is a production function of several heterogeneous inputs; given the level q of inputs supplied, we ask how the total output should be shared among the inputs. In what follows we will use the cost sharing interpretation, although all the results can be translated indistinctly to the surplus sharing interpretation. 1 When the demand of each good i is binary (either zero or one) the most compelling cost sharing formula comes from the application to this context of the solution proposed by Shapley (1953) . This formula was originally dened in the framework of cooperative games with transferable utility. Shubik (1962) was the rst to apply this concept to the division of joint costs. For that we need to build for the cost sharing problem an associated cooperative game, where the goods are identi ed as players and the characteristic function c : 2 N ! is de ned by c(S) = C(e S ) for all subsets of goods S N, where e S i = 1 if i 2 S and zero otherwise. If we want to produce the set of goods N, the cost of each good i is computed according to the Shapley value (1) which is an expectation of the marginal costs of good i.
In the variable demand context of totally divisible goods the extension of the Shapley formula is given by an application of the theory developed by Aumann and Shapley (1974) for non-atomic games. This work starts with the Billera, Heath and Raanan (1978) paper devoted to the example of telephone billing. Now the problem is modeled as a non-atomic game with a continuum of n types of players: each good i is represented by q i mass of players of type i. Each coalition of players S is identi ed by the vector q(S) = (q 1 (S); :::; q n (S)), where q i (S) is the Lebesgue measure of players of type i in coalition S. The non-atomic game f c is de ned by f c (S) = C(q(S)), for any coalition S: 2 Given appropriate smooth regularity conditions to the 1 For comprehensive surveys about this topic the reader is referred to Tauman (1988) and Young (1994) .
2 Alternatively, one can use multilevel games, i.e. games in which players can participate in any coalition S N with di erent (continuum) levels of "activity". Therefore, good i is identi ed with player i and demand q i is identi ed with the corresponding level of participation of player i. See Calvo and Santos (1997) for more details. cost function C, the Aumann-Shapley prices impute the following cost share of good i given a demand pro le q by:
Here the AS formula computes the marginal costs of good i along the "diagonal" (i.e., the straight line from 0 to q). The two rst axiomatic characterizations of this formula in economic cost allocation setting were given by Billera and Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982) . A discussion for alternative cost sharing rules applied to this context can be found in Friedman and Moulin (1995) , and should be noted that the AS rule looks the more appropriate when the demand q i is an anonymous aggregate of transferable individual demands among agents.
Recently, Moulin (1995) considered the discrete case in which the outputs of the production process come in indivisible units so that a pro le of demands q is a list of non negative integers, i.e. q i 2 = f0; 1; 2; :::g: He extends the Shapley value theory for cooperative games to this model in what is called the discrete Aumann-Shapley pricing method. The way to nd it is as follows: given the demand pro le (q 1 ; :::; q n ) consider the cooperative "replica" game with (q 1 +:::+q n ) players where each unit of demanded good is regarded as a di erent player, then compute the Shapley value of that replica game. The result gives the unit cost (price) imputed to each good by the discrete Aumann-Shapley rule. In Sprumont and Wang (1998) an axiomatic characterization of this is o ered.
The appropriate game-theoretic tool for modeling this setting is found in the so called multichoice games. These are games in which each player has a certain nite number of activity levels at which he can play. In general, di erent players may have di erent possible levels, and the worth that a coalition can obtain depends on the level at which each player of the coalition has decided to participate. Hsiao and Raghavan (1993) introduced games in which all players have the same number of activity levels. They de ned extended Shapley values by using weights on activity levels, each level having the same weight for all players. Nouweland et al. (1995) considered the more general case with di erent numbers of activity levels, and proposed an alternative extension for the Shapley value based on an extension of the probabilistic formula by orders. They called it the multichoice value. Calvo and Santos (1997) o ered an axiomatic characterization in game-theoretic terms and proved that the multichoice value corresponds to the Shapley value of the corresponding replica game. So, the translation to the discrete cost sharing setting of the multichoice value yields exactly the discrete AS rule. A formula to compute the discrete AS prices based in the multichoice value is as follows: Given a demand pro le q 2 n , de ne for any i 2 This turns out again to be a marginal cost expectation of good i: Of course, if q 2 f0; 1g n , ' i (C; q) = Sh i (C; q):
Our goal is to extend the Aumann-Shapley prices to the general setting of mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., problems in which divisible goods and indivisible ones can be produced simultaneously. The formula that will be used to compute the AS price mechanism is the application to the cost allocation problem of the asymptotic multilevel value for the corresponding mixed multilevel value. This kind of games was considered in Calvo and Santos (1998) . They are games in which there are two di erent types of players in the game simultaneously: The rst type are players which have a continuum of level options to be in the game, while the level of participation of the players of the second type can be measured only with integer numbers. We call these mixed multilevel games. We also call them continuum games when all the players are of the rst type and multichoice games when all the players are of the second type. In Calvo and Santos (1997) an asymptotic relation was shown between the multichoice values of a sequence of multichoice games which converge to the continuum game and the value of this continuum game (the Aumann-Shapley value). By using the same asymptotic approach the asymptotic value of a mixed multilevel game was de ned in Calvo and Santos (1998): a mixed multilevel game is regarded as a limit of sequences of multichoice games, where only a nite number of levels is allowed for the continuum type of players. If the values of these multichoice games converge to the same limit, regardless of the sequence used, then this limit is called the asymptotic value of the original mixed game. In that paper it is proved that when the characteristic function of the game is smooth with respect to the levels of the continuum type of players, then the asymptotic value exists and can be computed by using a diagonal formula. This formula is obtained by following the multilinear approach. Owen (1972) de nes the concept of multilinear extension of a TU-game: this extension can be seen as a continuum game, thereby the Shapley value turns out to be the Aumann-Shapley value of its multilinear extension. Analogously, we de ne the continuous extension of a mixed multilevel game and we prove that the asymptotic value of the mixed multilevel game turns out to be the Aumann-Shapley value of its continuous extension.
We present a set of properties that involve only cost functions and quantities consumed, and thus do not depend on any game theory notion, that characterizes this price mechanism. This yields a justi cation in economic cost allocation terms of this proposal.
Following this introduction, Section 2 introduces the formula for mixed cost allocation problems and shows a list of properties that satis es it. In Section 3, we state the main characterization theorem and its proof. Finally, in Section 4 we include some interesting remarks. The formula that we introduce here was developed in Calvo and Santos (1998) for mixed multilevel games. There the mixed cost allocation problem is transformed into a new continuum problem by using a multilinear extension, and then the Aumann-Shapley prices for continuum games as de ned in (2) are used to compute the prices. More precisely:
Given a mixed cost allocation (C; (z; )), we build a new cost function Let us now list several properties that could be desirable for a price mechanism.
AXIOM 1 (Cost Sharing). This property speci es that the cost shares should satisfy the budget balance restriction of recovering cost. We say that a cost allocation procedure p satis es cost sharing if Note that the rescaling property should not be applied to the discrete goods in S, because taking a j = j , j 2 S, the property implies that prices should not depend on intermediate costs (i.e., costs of producing j j ).
AXIOM 4 (Positivity). The content of this monotonicity property is that if it costs more to produce more then costs should be non negative. We say that C is nondecreasing if (x; ) (z; ) implies that C(x; ) C(z; ): The price mechanism p satis es Positivity when if C is nondecreasing then p i (C; (z; )) 0 for all i 2 A(z) A( ): (8)
The next two properties are implied by the requirement that goods which have the same e ect on cost should have the same prices, so if we have a set of goods for which the quantities demanded enter additively into the cost function, we may view them as a single homogeneous good (e.g. blue cars and red cars) and then the price should be the same. characterize the AS price mechanism (see for example Tauman (1988) ).
AXIOM 7 (Linear Equivalence). The last property asserts that if the cost is linear with respect to any particular continuum commodity, that commodity can also be considered as discrete. For example, if the cost of producing beer is linear and it is considered as a continuum good measured in liters, then the price of this good should be independent of wether we want to consider its production only in a discrete way and measure it in barrels. However, if the cost is not linear, making a discrete approximation forces a loss of information in the cost structure and hence it is not reasonable for this property to hold. 
3 Characterization
In this section we show that the properties listed above are satis ed by the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism. Moreover, they are enough to characterize uniquely this solution: This is the content of the main theorem of this work.
Theorem 1 A price mechanism p on P satis es axioms 1-7 if, and only if, p :
We need a rst lemma that will be useful in the proof Additivity. Because the multilinear extension is linear with respect to the cost function, i.e., E (C + C 0 ) = E C + E C 0 , and the AS price mechanism is additive for continuum problems, the axiom follows immediately.
M-Rescaling. Let a 2 M ++ , L(a) and C 0 be as de ned in axiom 3. It can be checked that E C 0 (z; ) = E C(a z; ): The axiom is implied by the fact that the AS prices satisfy the axiom for continuum problems.
Positivity. If (x; ) (z; ) implies that C(x; ) C(z; ) then it is straightforward that E C(x; y) E C(z; y), for all x z, and y 2 0; 1] S :
Hence @ x i E C(z; y) 0 and so i For j 6 = i, it is immediate that @ j E (z i ; ) F( ) = @ j E C 0 ( ), hence the result follows from the formula of :
Proof of Theorem 1 By Proposition ?? satis es the axioms 1-7. So it only remains to prove unicity. Let p be a price mechanism on P: First note that if S = ; then axioms 1-5 imply that p : If S 6 = ; by the S-Consistency axiom it is su cient to prove that p for 2 f0; 1g S (hint: if 6 = e make a new "replica" cost problem with P j2S j discrete goods, then the prices must be the same in both problems). Let (z; ) 2 L, 2 f0; 1g S , 6 = 0; and a cost function C. Consider its multilinear extension E C,i.e., Remark 3 The aggregation in one homogeneous good (consistency axioms) cannot be proclaimed for goods in M and S simultaneously. Consider for example the family of cost functions de ned in 0; 1 ; since if (x; ) 6 = (y; ) then x + 6 = y + , it follows that for any cost function C there exists a corresponding cost function F such that C(z; ) = F(z + ): Therefore the axiom should imply that p 1 (C; (z; )) = p 2 (C; (z; )) for all games on 0; 1 , which is not very reasonable. This is why we use one axiom for each type of good, continuous or discrete.
Remark 4 We show here that the axioms are independent. First note that axioms 1-5 characterize and they are independent. Hence, we only prove that axioms 6 and 7 are necessary. The price mechanism ? de ned by Remark 5 Axioms 1-5 imply that the price mechanism p must coincide with the AS price mechanism for continuum problems (S = ;). Axioms 1-5 jointly with axiom 7 imply that p must coincide with the Shapley value Sh for TU problems, i.e., M = ; and 2 f0; 1g S : Finally, axioms 1-7 imply that p coincides with the multichoice value for discrete problems, i.e., M = ; and 2 S :
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